Abstract
INTRODUCTION
One major factor for Indonesian companies vulnerable to the negative impact of financial crisis in 1997 was the weakness of internal mechanisms of corporate governance. Similar to the experience of other corporate entities in the region, the failure of Indonesian companies to implement corporate governance practices carefully in the management of their companies are associated with a number of factors, including high concentration of corporate ownership and lack of transparency in the procedures for the acquisition of the company and controls. In addition to problems of inefficiency, Indonesian corporate sector is also vulnerable to the problem of risk exposure associated with more dependence on external funding, especially when there is effective oversight by the Board of Commissioners in Indonesia and inadequate monitoring by creditors (Asian Development Bank 1999) .
Since the financial crises in various countries between 1997-1998 that preceded the crisis in Thailand (1997), followed by other countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore, which eventually turned into the Asian financial crisis, were results of poor Corporate Governance(CG) in Asian countries.
The failure of some companies and the emergence of financial malpractices that occurred due to crisis is the worst evidence of the weak practice of GCG among countries. According to Pangestu and Hariyanto (Suprayitno et al. 2004 ), characteristics of weak practices of GCG in Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, are (1) the concentration of insider ownership and the power of shareholders (including the government and related parties of the center of power), (2) weak governance in financial sector, and (3) the ineffectiveness of internal regulations and the lack of legal protection for minority shareholders to deal with major shareholders and managers.
According to a research conducted by Black, et.al (2003) , there is a strong and robust relationship between the implementation of GCG with the profitability of companies in South Korea and Russia (Black, 2001) . These findings highlight that companies with GCG will perform better both financially and in market value. There is a need to perform a similar research in Indonesia to find out whether the result would be consistent with other parts of the world.Previous researches studied the to analyze secondary data dependent variables (endogenous) are Return on Assets (ROA)and Tobins' Q. This research will be using data panel to compute all the data obtained and will be using E Views as a computer software tool to organize the data. The observation of data was conducted 5 times by 5 different individuals to minimize biasness and error. The qualifications of those collecting the data were final year students of Accounting major students of undergraduate students and post graduate students, to verify the data using the questionnaire built using the OECD standard of Good Corporate Governance.
The choice of research sample was to use purposive sampling method, which is to use certain criteria in the sample selection, the criteria of sampling choice in this 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Good Corporate Governance and Firm's Profitability
Based on the paired tests of 3 data panel regression models, as indicated in Table 1 Managers who believe the corporations will go well will purchase stocks that can be the motor of increasing the value of corporations like in Japan (Morch et al, 2000) , and other countries (Khan et al, 2009 , Frakes 2007 , Jiao 2010 would effect the value of firm positively. Based on this finding, the larger the instutional ownership, the more effective management performance will be. There were three hypothesis for the relationship between instutional ownership and the value of firm.
The first interpretation was the efficient monitoring hypothesis. This hypothesis revealed that individual investors and inside owners with low ownership of stocks (minority) had a tendency to lend its voting power to institutional investors to control the performance of management. Majority institutional investors would be on the side of minority stockholders when they share a common interest, particularly in obtaining economic incentive both in the long run (dividend) and short run (abnormal stock return). This action would impact on the growth of corporate value shown by the increase of stock price.
The second interpretation was the strategic alignment. Different from the first one, this hypothesis stated that majority institutional investors had a tendency to compromise, or on the side of management, ignored the interest of minority stockholders. The assumption that the management often takes actions and makes policies that were less than optimal and tending to personal interest, causing the strategic alliance between majority institutional investors and the management, is negatively responded by the public. This would lead to the decrease of stock price.
The third interpretation was the conflict of interest hypothesis. This hypotheses basically shared similar concept with the second hypothesis, which was majority institutional investor to reduce conflict by compromising and allying with the management. Corporate Governance principle of role of stakeholders in corporate governance (C) have positive and significant effects on ROA, which is in support of the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984 and Mitchell, et.al, 1997 ) that states a corporation needs to work, identify its stakeholders to ensure long term sustainable attainment of corporations goals. This empirical finding also support Hofstede's finding that Indonesia is a highly collectivist country (Widjaja, 2010) (2004) found that honoring the rights of stockholders lead to higher firms' valuation. Stiglitz (1985) that states majority institutional investors provide increased ability to control the in Indonesia, because of the opportunistic attitude of business people (Williamson, 1988) . This empirical finding is also similar to the findings in Hong Kong researched by Leung and Horwitz (2004) that concentrated ownership is correlated with low voluntary disclosure. In this case, the concentrated ownership is the shares owned by the families listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Secondly, IFRS were to be implemented in Indonesia starting from 2012. The annual reports in this study only From this result, the most important principle of Corporate Governance influencing both the manufacturing firms' profitability and manufacturing firms' value is disclosure and transparencies, followed by equitable treatment of shareholders. This means the improvement of these principles implementation in Indonesia will fundamentally strengthen the corporate governance implementation in Indonesia.
Besides that, we learn that Profitability plays a more vital role in influencing the Indonesian manufacturing firms' value compared to Corporate Governance Index that represent the cumulative implementation of corporations. Those that have high earnings would tend to use debt as a source of financing and those of low earnings will issue shares to the public. 
CONCLUSION
